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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS RASMUSSEN AND GRISWOLD 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal of a summary judgment rendered in the Fourth 
Circuit Court, Provo Department. This appeal is from the judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff and also from the award of attorney's fees 
and a higher rate of interest. Jurisdiction is conveyed on this 
Court to hear appeals from the final judgment of Circuit Courts by 
§ 78-2a-3 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1 
(a) Whether sufficient issues of fact were raised to avoid 
summary judgment against Defendant. This is a question of law for 
the Court to review for correctness, according no particular 
deference to the trial court. Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie 
Power, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). 
(b) Whether Plaintiff alleged or proved sufficient facts to 
determine that Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. is the 
"alter ego" of Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold. Inasmuch as 
summary judgment was granted on all issues, the standard of review 
is as referred to above. 
(c) Whether the trial court erred in awarding a higher rate 
of interest to Plaintiff as well as an attorney's fee based upon 
invoices supplied by Plaintiff along with deliveries. This is a 
question of law where the legal conclusions are of the trial court 
are reviewed for correctness, with this Court granting the trial 
court no particular deference. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 26 
(Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. summary judgment. (relevant part only) 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the 
action or after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
2 
taken under advisement (R.230). The Court, in a memorandum ruling 
dated March 25, 1993, granted Summary Judgment against all 
Defendants briefly stating that Defendants have not "met these 
arguments with affidavit or documentation insufficient specificity 
to raise the argument of a material issue of fact" (R.252-253). 
Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold filed a Motion to Amend the 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 on April 5, 1993 (R.254-255). The 
Summary Judgment was entered on May 7, 1993 (R.299-301), the court 
denied Defendants1 Motion to Amend the Judgment by Memorandum of 
June 9, 1993 (R.352) and the Order Denying the Motion was entered 
on July 8, 1993 (R.356-357). 
Plaintiff, along with its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
provided a Memorandum of Points and Authorities which set forth 
Plaintiff's version of the facts and supported that version by 
minimal affidavits and copies of documents which Plaintiff obtained 
from Defendants Card and Card in response to its discovery- The 
affidavits, which are not marked as part of the record, but are in 
a separate "exhibits" envelope, set forth only that the services 
and materials were provided, and that a review has been made of the 
records provided by Defendants Card and Card, and that these appear 
to be the only records in existence. Based on that assumption, 
Plaintiff alleges certain facts that it claims to have been proved, 
as part of its memorandum. Plaintiff has alleged that it supplied 
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labor and materials to Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., 
between August 14, 1986 and March 12, 1987 in the amount of 
$13,855.74 (R.125). Plaintiff further alleges that no payment was 
made by Architectural Sheet Metal (R.124). Plaintiff alleges that 
the terms of its invoices provide for interest and attorney's fees 
and that the amounts claimed are reasonable (R.124). Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold are owners of 490 of 
the 1,000 outstanding shares of stock in Architectural Sheet 
Metals, and that Defendant Rasmussen was a member of the Board of 
Directors and an officer (R.124). Plaintiff alleges that 
Architectural Sheet Metals and Architectural Specialties, Inc. were 
"controlled by the same group of people" and that Architectural 
Specialties is "a majority stockholder" of Architectural Sheet 
Metals (R.123). Plaintiff further alleges that the two 
corporations were intertwined and that they worked together, 
sharing assets and interlocking corporate structures (R.123). 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Architectural Sheet Metals did not 
keep records as to organizational meetings, by-laws, or annual 
meetings, and did not observe other corporate formalities (R.122-
123). 
The various Defendants in the matter filed affidavits of their 
own contesting the material facts set forth in Plaintiff's 
affidavits. William C. Card alleges that Architectural 
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favor upon all or any part thereof. 
For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may 
be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
is an action by Plaintiff to collect an amount claimed to 
for labor and materials furnished to Defendant 
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Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. on open account. Defendant 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., now defunct, was a contractor 
working with sheet metal on roofs, store fronts, and other exterior 
building surfaces. Plaintiff supplied aluminum products to 
Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. Plaintiff's Complaint, 
filed on January 19, 1989, claimed that Defendants Ray Rasmussen 
and others controlled the corporation to such an extent that the 
corporation was their "alter ego" and that judgment should be 
rendered against them individually for corporate debts (R.l-3). 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 1, 1990 in which 
it added additional Defendants, including William Griswold, also 
claiming that Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. was their alter ego 
(R.89-91). Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against 
all Defendants, including Ray Rasmussen and William L. Griswold on 
January 28, 1992 claiming that there were no genuine issues as to 
any material facts and that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment 
against each Defendant as a matter of law (R.114-115). After 
responsive memoranda and Affidavits were filed, the District Court, 
on its own motion, transferred the matter to Spanish Fork Circuit 
Court (R.189). The Court in Spanish Fork recused itself (R.217) 
and the matter was then transferred to Provo Circuit. Oral 
arguments were heard on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
December 16, 1992 before Hon. E. Patrick McGuire and the matter was 
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Specialties, Inc., is a Utah corporation owned by himself and his 
son, William Lane Card. The corporation is managed by father and 
son, and "at no time has Ray Rasmussen been involved in the 
management of Architectural Specialties, Inc." (R.141). William C. 
Card alleges that Ray Rasmussen formed Architectural Sheet Metal 
and operated the business on his own, despite the fact that a 
majority interest in Architectural Sheet Metals was owned by 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. (R.141). William C. Card alleges 
that although the two corporations operated out of the same office, 
they did not share employees, bank accounts, or other assets, and 
they were operated completely separately (R.141). He also alleges 
that he was not aware of the invoices that were signed, and that 
those who signed such invoices were not authorized to bind 
Architectural Specialties to terms of interest and attorney!s fees 
(R.140). 
William Lane Card alleges that, although he was an officer of 
Architectural Sheet Metal, he took no part in running its business 
and received no compensation (R.144). He was never a stockholder 
in Architectural Sheet Metal (R.145). 
Ray Rasmussen, in his affidavit, directly contradicts certain 
statements made by William C. Card regarding the operation of 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc.; but supports William C. Card in 
denying that the corporation was an alter ego of any of its 
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shareholders. Ray Rasmussen alleges that he was hired by William 
C. Card to do work for Architectural Sheet Metal, formerly 
Precision Sheet Metal, in a non-management capacity (R.162-3). 
When the business was incorporated in 1986, he became an officer 
and director and part owner (R.162). He alleges that the Articles 
of Incorporation and other necessary formal documents were prepared 
by Spafford & Spafford, attorneys for William C. Card, and that 
meetings were held and minutes kept, despite the fact that he does 
not know of the whereabouts of such minutes at this time (R.162). 
Mr. Rasmussen alleges that he was issued 245 of the 1,000 shares of 
stock in the corporation, that he functioned first as vice 
president, and then later as president of the corporation, being 
responsible for day-to-day operation (R.161). He also alleges that 
"William Card retained actual control of the corporation, and that 
all major decisions were made by William C. Card or with Mr. Card's 
approval." Mr. Rasmussen alleges that Architectural Specialties 
was a completely separate corporation in which he had no interest 
and no authority, and that they kept their affairs completely 
separate, outside of the joint office and the sharing of a 
secretary, the salary of whom was paid partly by each corporation 
(R.160-1). Mr. Rasmussen alleges that he did not personally order 
any of the materials allegedly delivered by Plaintiff and that he 
did not indicate at any time, either in writing or orally, that he 
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would be responsible for the payment for such items (R.159-160). 
Mr. Rasmussen also alleges that he resigned as officer and director 
of Architectural Sheet Metal and relinquished his stock in that 
corporation on December 10, 1988. He also alleges that Mr. 
Griswold had absolutely no ownership of the corporation at any time 
prior to 1988, and that he did not participate at any time in 
management of the corporation or in any other manner which might 
subject him to personal liability for corporate debts (R.159). 
Mr. Griswold alleges that he was hired by William C. Card as 
a sheet metal worker for Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc. in July, 
1986, under a union contract (R.155-6). He alleges that he never 
participated in any management responsibility for the corporation, 
though he did supervise field workers and occasionally signed an 
invoice for a delivery, if there was no one else to do so (R.155). 
In 1988, he was transferred 245 shares of stock in the corporation, 
primarily to allow him to operate outside of the union contract, as 
a part owner of the corporation, but that he did not function in a 
management capacity even after being given the stock (R.154-5). He 
did not order any of the materials allegedly delivered by Southam 
& Warburton, and does not know anything about any agreement between 
the corporation and Plaintiff for such orders (R.154). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Summary judgment was granted in favor of Plaintiff against all 
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Defendants, both corporate and individual on all items requested by 
Plaintiff. Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold contend that this is 
not an appropriate case for summary judgment in that the affidavits 
presented by Plaintiff in support of their motion were controverted 
by Defendants as to material facts necessary to grant a summary 
judgment. Once the facts are in controversy, the allegations 
contained in Plaintiffs affidavits may not be used to grant summary 
judgment. 
The affidavits provided by Plaintiff in support of its motion 
for summary judgment, along with the memorandum of support of the 
motion tend, if anything, to show a unity of interest in the 
corporate Defendants Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc. and 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. They are not directed at 
supporting, nor are they sufficient to support, a claim that 
Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc. is an "alter ego" of Defendants 
Ray Rasmussen and William Griswold, or find personal liability 
against these Defendants. 
Neither Defendants Ray Rasmussen or William Griswold entered 
into any contract with Plaintiff, either personally or by 
implication, sufficient to grant authority to the trial court to 
award a reasonable attorney's fee or a higher than normal rate of 
interest against these Defendants. Because such an award must be 
based on a statute or a contract, neither of which exists in this 
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case, such an award must fail. 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES RAISE CONTESTED ISSUES OF 
FACT SUFFICIENT TO AVOID SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS. 
The judgment at issue in this action was rendered pursuant to 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. That rule allows for a party to move for judgment 
in his favor "with or without supporting affidavits" and for the 
adverse party to "serve opposing affidavits." (See Rule 56(c) 
U.R.C.P. above). 
This procedure is exactly what the title implies: it is a 
summary proceeding to render a judgment without a trial, and 
without a fact finder making a determination of facts, when those 
facts are not in dispute. See also 56(e) above. 
Plaintiff has filed its affidavits and copies of records 
setting forth its allegation of facts, as referred to above. The 
information provided by Plaintiff is uncontroverted insofar as it 
relates to a contract for provision of labor and materials between 
Plaintiff and Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against that Defendant 
appears well taken. Certain materials and labor were provided 
according to the contract, no payment was made thereon, and payment 
is due under the terms of the contract. Plaintiff has attempted, 
however, to stretch its requested summary judgment against other 
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Defendants. Once again, as it relates to Defendants Rasmussen and 
Griswold, the information submitted by Plaintiff contains some 
truth. It is true that Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold have been 
owners of a minority interest of the outstanding stock in 
Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc., and that Defendant Rasmussen has 
been a member of the Board of Directors and an Officer. From that 
point on, the information provided by Plaintiff which pertains to 
Rasmussen and Griswold is controverted. Plaintiff claims that the 
two corporate Defendants, Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc., and 
Architectural Specialties, Inc. were "controlled by the same group 
of people". Defendant's affidavits show that Defendants Rasmussen 
and Griswold have nothing to do with Architectural Specialties, 
Inc. Plaintiff claimed that the two corporate Defendants were 
intertwined and that they had no separate identities. Once again, 
that allegation is controverted by all Defendants. Finally, 
Plaintiff alleges that Architectural Sheet Metals did not keep 
records required by law of corporations, and did not observe other 
corporate formalities. Once again, these allegations have been 
controverted by the affidavits of Defendants, most specifically, 
the affidavit of Ray Rasmussen. Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold 
contend that there are no grounds for summary judgment against 
them, even if all of the affidavits of Plaintiff are true in their 
entirety. Nevertheless, for purposes of summary judgment, any 
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contravention is sufficient to prohibit the court from determining 
that truthfulness. The Utah Supreme Court has set out that 
standard for summary judgment in Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie 
Power, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990) as follows: 
We note the applicable standard of review. Summary 
judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material 
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 789 P.2d at 25. 
In Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992) that Court 
added: 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we consider the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party 
and affirm only if there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issue of fact or if, accepting the facts as 
contended for by the losing party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Lucky Seven Rodeo Corporation v. 
Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1988), went on to say: 
It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material 
facts in ruling on a summary judgment. Spor v. Crested 
Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 
1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Oberhansley, 751 P.2d at 
1156. It matters not that the evidence on one side may 
appear to be strong or even compelling. Spor, 740 P.2d 
at 1308; Oberhansley, 751 P. 2d at 1156. One sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create 
an issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary 
judgment. 755 P.2d at 752. 
As it pertains to Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold, virtually 
every averment of material fact made by Plaintiff in its affidavits 
was controverted by the affidavits of these Defendants. In several 
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places, those affidavits were supported by affidavits of William C. 
Card and William Lane Card. In other areas (such as who managed 
Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc.) those affidavits were 
controverted by the Cards. No matter who controverted what 
allegations, the fact that they were controverted in itself was 
sufficient to require the trial court to deny summary judgment. 
The court's claim in its ruling that there were no material facts 
in controversy has no support whatsoever and is therefore in error. 
The court must be reversed and a trial ordered. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC. IS NOT THE 
"ALTER EGO" OF DEFENDANTS RASMUSSEN OR GRISWOLD, AND 
THERE ARE NO FACTS SHOWN, EITHER DISPUTED OR UNDISPUTED, 
TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth, in Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co. , 596 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the standard for 
disregarding a corporate entity and granting judgment against 
stockholders or officers of a corporation personally. The Court 
there said: 
. . . in order to disregard the corporate entity, there 
must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there 
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist, vis., the corporation is, in 
fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) 
the observance of the corporate form would sanction a 
fraud, promote injustice, or an ineguitable result would 
follow. 596 P.2d at 1030. 
The affidavits promulgated by Plaintiff do not meet this 
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standard. They do not show that Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold 
had "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer 
exist". The affidavits of Plaintiff appear to be more directly 
aimed at Defendants William C. Card and William Lane Card. The 
affidavits claim that the Cards, either indirectly or through their 
other corporation, so intertwined their affairs, that the debt of 
one should belong to the other. The Cards, of course, have 
controverted those affidavits, and a trial is necessary to 
determine the truth of the matters. Admittedly, Defendant 
Rasmussen was an officer and director of Architectural Sheet Metal 
during the period in question. That is as far as Plaintiff1 s 
affidavits go, and as far as they can go. Plaintiffs, of course, 
claim that Defendant Rasmussen is involved in the ownership or 
management of Architectural Specialties, Inc. • This would not be 
sufficient to support a summary judgment, if it were true. Since 
it is clearly controverted, and is not true, Plaintiffs have no 
support whatsoever for their "alter ego" claim against Mr. 
Rasmussen. 
The trial court apparently missed the boat completely in 
dealing with Defendant Griswold. Mr. Griswold was an employee of 
Architectural Specialties on a union contract. He became a 
minority stockholder long after the labor and materials were 
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supplied to Architectural Sheet Metal. He was never involved in 
management, never had authority to sign checks, never sat on the 
board of directors, and never participated in any activity which 
would subject him to personal liability for the corporation. The 
trial court did not set forth any basis for finding Mr. Griswold 
personally liable on corporate debts, nor could it have done so. 
In fact, there appears to be some question whether the inclusion of 
both Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold in the summary judgment was 
clerical error. In its Memorandum Decision denying the Motion of 
Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold to amend judgment, the court 
stated: 
It was the courts intent to hold the defendants 
[Architectural] Specialties, Inc., William C. Card and 
William Lane Card liable on the debt and hereby denies 
Defendants motion to amend judgment (R.313). 
Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold made several unsuccessful 
attempts to get the court to clarify whether it had been the 
court's original intent to hold them personally liable with the 
Cards. No response was made to those attempts, and an Order 
Denying Defendants1 Motion to Amend the Judgment as prepared by 
counsel for Plaintiff was signed by the Court over the written 
objection of these Defendants. We cannot know whether the Court 
saw some reason to include these Defendants in its summary 
judgment, or whether it was a mistake. What we can tell, however, 
is that the Court has expressed no justification for including 
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them, and the record itself strongly militates against such a 
finding of justification. Not only the affidavits, but the 
memorandum of Plaintiff's counsel in support of the motion for 
summary judgment, concentrated heavily on the relationship between 
Architectural Sheet Metals, Architectural Specialties, and the 
Cards, who controlled both corporations. A review of the 
affidavits and other supporting material seems to support a 
conclusion that Mr. Rasmussen and Mr. Griswold were thrown into the 
lawsuit because they happened to have some connection with 
Architectural Specialties, and not because there was a valid cause 
of action against them. Unfortunately, once the trial court had 
made up its mind to go beyond that corporate entity, it apparently 
made no attempt to review the case against the individual 
Defendants, but made an invalid assumption that anyone named as a 
Defendant must be liable, without any other grounds. Defendants 
Rasmussen and Griswold are individuals who had something to do with 
Architectural Sheet Metals (but not Architectural Specialties). 
The law requires that they be treated as individuals and that the 
case against them be reviewed for correctness as to each of them. 
A finding by the Court that other individual Defendants may have 
some personal liability is not enough to paint them all with the 
same broad brush. Because there is no evidence against these 
Defendants as individuals, a judgment against them cannot be 
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sustained• 
Plaintiff, in its memorandum below, relied heavily on the Utah 
Court of Appeals case of Colman v. Colman, 743 P. 2d 782 (Utah App. 
1987). That case discussed some of the factors that might be 
considered in "piercing the corporate veil" or in a determination 
that a corporation was the "alter ego" of one or more persons who 
controlled it. The Court there stated: 
. . . the basic question raised in an alter ego case is 
whether the principal had personal control over assets 
which he claimed to belong to the corporation. 743 P.2d 
at 785. 
This was a divorce case in which the question before the court 
was whether certain assets belonged to a corporation in which the 
husband was a stockholder or whether the assets were properly 
identified as marital assets. The Court discussed more at length 
the kinds of things it looked for in making a decision. Before 
doing so, however, it stated: 
Consequently, the corporate veil which protects 
stockholders from individual liability will only be 
pierced reluctantly and cautiously. 743 P.2d at 786. 
The Court went on to say: 
Certain factors which are deemed significant, although 
not conclusive, in determining whether this test has been 
met include: (1) under capitalization of a one-man 
corporation; (2) failure to observe corporate 
formalities; (3) non-payment of dividends; (4) syphoning 
of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder; (5) non-
functioning of other officers or directors; (6) absence 
of corporate records; (7) the use of the corporation as 
a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or 
18 
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in 
promoting injustice or fraud. Id. 
The Court of Appeals did, in that case, find sufficient 
evidence to "pierce the corporate veil". It did so after a lengthy 
review of many factors which showed that the husband controlled the 
corporation so completely that there was no difference between the 
two entities. Admittedly, he used the corporate bank account as 
his personal account, he held corporate property in his own name 
"because it was more convenient than observing appropriate 
corporate procedures" he did not file a corporate tax return, and 
he kept no corporate records. Admittedly, Architectural Sheet 
Metal, Inc. was not perfect in its record keeping. The affidavits 
of the individual Defendants, however, are more than sufficient to 
show that it had a separate existence from those individuals. 
Because the stockholders and Defendants disagree as to who 
controlled Architectural Sheet Metals, Inc., a trial may yet 
determine that one of them, or the parent corporation, may have 
some additional liability. It is not, however, likely from the 
affidavits and the records which did show that salaries were paid 
out for employees, separate accounts were kept, corporate meetings 
were held, and tax returns were filed. 
The Colman court found that allowing the husband to claim that 
certain assets were corporate and not part of the marital estate, 
"would result in a great injustice to Plaintiff." Plaintiff here 
19 
would like the court to believe that there is a similar injustice. 
Obviously there is not. A supplier of building materials to a 
corporate contractor on open account always faces the potential 
that that corporate contractor may go out of business and be unable 
to pay its bills. That fact in itself is not sufficient to 
disregard the corporate entity. There are things that a supplier 
can do to protect itself from the beginning. It can require 
corporate officers to sign an account agreement and guarantee 
personally that account. Plaintiff did not attempt to do so here. 
What Plaintiff is attempting to do is to look for some way, after 
the fact, to protect itself from its own sloppy business practices. 
Disregarding the corporate form and bringing in minority 
stockholders like William Griswold who have had nothing to do with 
the transactions at all, and did not even own stock in the 
corporation at the time of the transactions, is just going too far. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS 
RASMUSSEN AND GRISWOLD REQUIRING THESE DEFENDANTS TO PAY 
INTEREST HIGHER THAN THE LEGAL RATE, OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Plaintiff has alleged, and it has not been controverted, that 
the invoices on which it sold materials to Defendant Architectural 
Sheet Metal, Inc. provided for interest at 18% per year and a 
reasonable attorney's fee for collection. The trial court granted 
this high rate of interest and a reasonable attorney's fee to 
20 
Plaintiff against all Defendants, based upon those allegations and 
nothing more. In doing so, the trial court ignored a long line of 
case law in Utah to the effect that the sale of materials on open 
account through the use of such invoices is not sufficient to 
create a contract for attorney's fees and a higher rate of interest 
than that normally allowed by law. The Utah Supreme Court, in B & 
R Supply Co. v. Brinahurst, 503 P.2d 1216, 28 Ut.2d 442 (Utah 
1972), refused to enforce language in an invoice to the same 
effect. The Court, in rejecting Plaintiff's contention that a 
contract was made by signing the invoice, stated: 
In analyzing the contention of the plaintiffs it is 
appropriate to revert to and apply elemental principles 
of contract law; that the creation of a contract requires 
a meeting of the minds of the parties; and that the 
burden of so proving is upon the party who claims there 
is a contract (plaintiff here). In applying those rules 
to the instant fact situation it is first to be observed 
that the conditions of the invoice are aptly described by 
the defendants as "small inconspicuous print." 
Defendants affidavit avers that they ". . . at no time 
whatsoever authorized any of the persons who signed 
certain invoices. . . to contract on his behalf. . . 
other than on open accounts." There is no affirmative 
showing to the contrary, nor that any contractual terms 
or conditions on the invoices were called to their 
attention, nor that they were aware of them, nor that 
they did anything other than to initial the invoices 
acknowledging the receipt of the merchandise. Under 
those circumstances we can see no basis for a conclusion 
that the Defendants entered a contract to pay attorney's 
fees. 28 Ut.2d at 444. 
The Supreme Court went even further in the case of Spanish 
Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 508 P.2d 1186, 29 
21 
Ut.2d 312 (Utah 1973), where it referred to a footnote in the B & 
R Supply Company case thusly: 
This Court further observed in footnote four at page 1218 
of 503 P.2d that if one ordered merchandise, which was 
agreed to be delivered for a requested price, that would 
be the extent of both the contract and the purchaser!s 
obligation. If upon receipt of the merchandise, the 
invoice or delivery slip the purchaser signed, purported 
to impose further conditions or covenants, a serious 
question would arise as to the question of whether there 
was any consideration for such further obligation. 20 
Ut.2d at 315. 
The Utah courts have not changed their position on this issue 
in the last 20 years. Unless Plaintiff can show that there was 
consideration for a separate agreement signed at the time of 
delivery whereby attorney's fees and interest were contracted for, 
and unless Plaintiff can show that the agent of Defendant had 
authority to sign such contracts and entered into the contract 
knowing what the contract called for, such invoices are of no 
significance and do not create a separate enforceable contract. 
Plaintiff, in its affidavits has not attempted to show these 
things. Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold certainly were not 
implicated in any such signings. Once again, at the very least, 
any evidence in support of summary judgment on this Point, is 
controverted; and the trial court cannot grant judgment without 
taking evidence. Because the trial court does not seem to have had 
in mind the appropriate standards at the time it issued its 
judgment, this court should remand this matter to the trial court 
22 
with explicit and detailed instructions as to what will be 
sufficient to find for Plaintiff on each of the issues presented. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment against any of 
the individual Defendants herein because there are sufficient 
controverted facts to prevent Plaintiff from being entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. There is no evidence against 
Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold sufficient to suggest that the 
corporation known as Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. is the "alter 
ego" of Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold; and Plaintiff is not 
entitled to summary judgment against personally for debts of that 
corporation. Further, there is no valid contract for attorney's 
fees or a higher than normal interest rate; and therefore the 
judgment for attorney's fees and interest should be reversed. 
DATED this / day of December, 1993. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
£j &c^ 0LCM-L-
W. Andrew McCullough y 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Appellants Rasmussen and Griswold 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of December, 1993, I 
did mail two true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellants 
Rasmussen and Griswold, postage prepaid to Clark R. Nielsen, 
Attorney for Appellants Card and Architectural Specialties; 185 
South State, #500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Ray M. Harding, Jr., 
Attorney for Appellee, P.O. Box 126, American Fork, Utah 84003. 
appeal\rasmussen.boa 
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RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No. 1363 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, 
INC., a Utah corporation RAY 
RASMUSSEN, WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM L. 
GRISWOLD, and ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-89-102 
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Ray M. Harding, 
Jr., pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. MATERIAL FACTS AS TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. Plaintiff supplied labor and materials to Defendant 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. on and between August 14, 1986, 
and March 12, 1987, in the amount of $13,855.74. (See Affidavit 
of Leslie R. Southam, paragraph 2, attached hereto as Exhibit 9) . 
3 
1 2. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. has failed 
P to pay on this matter despite the fact that demand has been made 
thereon. (Affidavit of Leslie R. Southam, paragraph 5). 
3. Plaintiff!s invoices provide for a reasonable 
4 I attorney's fee for collection on accounts. (See Exhibit 4 
o attached hereto). 
4. Plaintiff's invoices also provide for interest on an 
outstanding account at the rate of 1.5 percent per month or 
7 || eighteen percent (18%) per annum. (See Exhibit 4). 
5. Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., (ASM) is a Utah 
Corporation, incorporated on June 16, 1986. (See Exhibit 1 
attached hereto). 
10 || 6. ASM's share register and stock transfer ledger 
indicate that Architectural Specialties, Inc. (ASI) is the owner 
of 510 shares, Ray Rasmussen is the owner of 245 shares, and 
William L. Griswold is the owner of 245 shares. (See Exhibit 2 
13 || attached hereto) . 
7. Todd Jason Wheeler, Raymond T. Rasmussen, and William 
C. Card were the incorporators and the initial directors of ASM. 
(See Exhibit 1 attached hereto). 
16 || 8. Ray Rasmussen, William C. Card and William L. Card 
-jy were the officers of ASM. (See 1986 tax return attached hereto 
as Exhibit 13). 
9. ASM failed to pass Corporate By-Laws. (See Affidavit 
19 || of Cort Griffin attached hereto as Exhibit 10). 
10. ASM also did business under the name of Precision 
Sheet Metal. (See letter from Ray Rasmussen to Charles LeBaron, 
attached hereto as Exhibit 12). 
11. ASM and ASI shared the same office location at 350 
South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
12. ASM and ASI are controlled by the same group of 
6 
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3 
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1 people. 
2 13. ASI is a majority stock holder of ASM. (See Exhibit 
2 attached hereto). 
14. ASI paid over $40,000 to ASM in the form of loans 
4 I  or payment of ASM's payroll and expenses. (See Exhibit 3 attached 
c hereto). 
15. Plaintiff's invoices received by ASM were stamped 
as received by ASI. (See exhibit 4 attached hereto). 
7 1  16. Officers of ASM signed invoices addressed to ASI. 
o (See Exhibit 5 attached hereto). 
17. Reynolds Metals Company sent an invoice to 
Defendants addressed to the following: Architectural Specialties 
10 || Inc. d.b.a. Architectural S/M 350 South 400 East, Suite 302, Salt 
Lake City 84111. (See Exhibit 6 attached hereto). 
18. ASI was billed for supplies used by ASM at least 
two job sites. (See Exhibit 7 attached hereto). 
13 || 19. William Card made personal loans to ASM. (See 
Exhibit 8 attached hereto). 
20. ASM made various payments to Ray Rasmussen for which 
payroll taxes were not deducted (See Exhibit 14 attached hereto). 
16 || 21. William C. Card and William Lane Card, were 
-17 signators on ASM's checking account and wrote out checks on ASM's 
behalf (See Exhibit 15 attached hereto). 
22. ASM had a contract for and did work on a project 
19 || entitled Foothill Village (See Exhibit 17 attached hereto). 
23. Materials for the Foothill Village project were 
billed and shipped to ASI. (See Exhibit 18 attached hereto). 
24. ASI secured and paid for insurance for ASM on the 
22 || Foothill Village project (See Exhibit 19 attached hereto). 
23|i 25. ASM failed to observe the following Corporate 
formalities: They did not hold an organizational meeting, they 
24 " 
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1 did not have an annual meeting of the shareholders and/or 
P directors, they did not pass any corporate resolutions. (See 
Affidavit of Cort Griffin, (Attached hereto as Exhibit 10). 
26. Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees in this 
4 I  matter are $2,531.25. (See Affidavit of Ray M. Harding, Jr., 
c attached hereto as Exhibit 11). 
II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
6 I  ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC. 
7 Rule 56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the moving 
party if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
9 || and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." 
The lack of genuine issue as to any material fact in the 
12 || present action as to Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
("ASM") is evidenced by the facts established by the Affidavit 
of Leslie R. Southam. 
All of the material and essential facts which form the 
15 || basis for the Plaintiff !s Complaint against Defendant ASM have 
-ig been established by the Affidavit of Leslie R. Southam, by the 
Defendants1 Answer to the Plaintiff's Complaint and by the 
Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel, Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
18 || in the present case, the Defendant ASM has accepted goods 
-jg and material in the sum of $13,855.74 which it has refused to pay 
for despite the fact that demand has been made therefore. 
The Plaintiff, pursuant to its Complaint, is entitled to 
21 || Judgment against the Defendant ASM in the sum of $13,855.74, plus 
22 interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from July 13, 1989, 
until paid in full, together with a reasonable attorney's fee 
incurred herein in the sum of $1,525 and for costs of court in 
24" 
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1 the sum of $93.00 and such other and further relief as the Court 
2 deems just and equitable in the premises. 
The attorney's fees in the present action are payable by 
the Defendant ASM pursuant to contract. (See Exhibit 4 attached 
4 I hereto) . 
g As set forth above, all of the essential facts of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint against ASM have been established and the 
Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment against ASM on the 
7 I Complaint. 
6 
o III. DEFENDANT ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC«S. CORPORATE VEIL 
SHOULD BE PIERCED AND PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 9 
10 
13 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendant 
Corporation, Architectural Sheet Metal Inc. (ASM), is the alter 
11 || ego of the Defendants Architectural Specialties, Inc. (ASI), Ray 
HO Rasmussen, William L. Card, William C. Card, and William L. 
Griswold. Under Utah Law, in order to disregard the corporate 
entity, there must be a concurrence of two circumstances: (1) 
14 || There must be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
-|5 separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist, that is, the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego 
of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the 
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an 
inequitable result would follow. Norman v. Murray First Thrift 
& Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979). The first prong is often 
termed the "formalities requirement." The second prong may be 
termed the "fairness requirement." 
Factors which are deemed significant in determining 
whether the test has been met include, among others, the 
following: 1) Undercapitalization; 2) Failure to observe 
corporate formalities; 3) Absence of corporate records; 4) The 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
3 
6 
1 use of the corporation as a facade for operations of the dominant 
p stockholder or stockholders; and 5) The use of the corporate 
entity in promoting injustice or fraud. See Colman v. Colman, 
743 P2d. 782 (Utah App. 1987). 
4 I The rationale used by Courts in permitting the corporate 
G- veil to be pierced is that if a principal shareholder or owner 
conducts his private and corporate business on an interchangeable 
or joint basis as if they were one, he is without standing to 
7 || complain when an injured party does the same. Id. at 786. The 
o Defendants in this action conducted their business as a joint 
enterprise, and therefore, pursuant to Utah Law, are without 
standing to assert that the corporate veil should not be pierced. 
10 || The following facts show that Plaintiff is entitled to Summary 
Judgment against the Defendants in this matter. 
A. ASM failed to observe corporate formalities. 
In response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of 
Documents, ASM provided Plaintiff's attorney with all of ASM's 
documents. There were no records of any minutes from an 
organizational meeting, no record to show that the corporation 
had either annual meetings or had passed annual resolutions 
adopting the actions of the officers and directors, and there 
were no By-Laws. 
In addition to the failure to maintain corporate minutes 
or adequate corporate records, the Defendants disregarded legal 
formalities and failed to maintain proper arms-length 
relationships between the related entities. They operated out 
of the same location. Officers of ASM would sign invoices for 
ASI. Invoices for ASM were stamped as received by ASI. 
ASM made various loans and payments to Ray Rasmussen for 
which payroll taxes were not deducted. 
Utah Law provides limited liability to a corporation only 
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1 when it abides by the statutes regarding corporate formalities. 
2 ASM has failed to abide by the requisite formalities. 
B. Undercapitalization 
Throughout its existence, ASM did not have adequate 
4 I  capitalization to meet its operating expenses. On numerous 
c occasions, ASI paid for ASM's payroll and other operating 
expenses. 
Additionally, ASI made several outright loans to ASM. 
7 || There is no evidence that ASI took any action to collect or 
o require repayment of those loans. 
The two corporations records show loans from ASI to ASM 
of $5,000 on July 16, 1986, only one month after incorporation. 
10 || There were subsequent loans of $5,000 on August 1, 1986 and 
August 11, 1986. On September 5, 1986 there was a loan in the 
amount of $22,447.27. ASI loaned ASM another $6,301.36 on 
September 5, 1987. 
13 || On May 11, 1987, September 15, 1987, October 8, 1987, 
March 21, 1988, and January 9, 1989, ASI helped ASM to meet its 
payroll. 
Altogether, ASI loaned or paid an excess of $50,000 to 
16 || ASM. The payment of this money by ASI is spread from the 
AJ\\ inception of ASM throughout its existence. It is clear from 
these facts that ASM was undercapitalized. 
C. ASI and ASM Were Conducted as a Joint Venture 
The records show that the two corporations were conducted 
on an interchangeable or joint basis as if they were one. As 
such, Defendants should be liable for the debts of each other. 
The two corporations shared offices. The day to day 
affairs of the two corporations were run by the same people. 
Invoices and records dealing with ASM were stamped with ASI 
stamps. Invoices to ASI were signed by officers of ASM. In one 
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1 case, a customer could not distinguish between the two and 
P addressed his invoice to Architectural Specialties Inc. d.b.a. 
Architectural Sheet Metal, 
ASI paid many of ASM's offices and business expenses. 
4II A review of ASM!s accounts payable shows that ASI paid ASMfs 
c office rents for the months of September through November of 
1987. Other accounts payable show that ASI paid ASM's expenses 
for telephone, gas, long-distance, medical expenses and insurance 
7 || for employees, payment due on ASM's loans from banks, and other 
miscellaneous expenses. These payments are too numerous to set 
out individually but are contained in the exhibits hereto. 
ASM's accounts payable for October, 1987, shows that ASM 
6 
11 
12 
14 
15 
10 || owed ASI $21,128.28, most of which was for office expenses and 
accounts payable that ASI had paid for. All of these payments 
were done without any formal agreement for repayment. 
Additionally, William Card loaned at least $5,000.00 on one 
13 || occasion to ASM, and other lesser amounts on several occasions. 
One example of the joint venture nature of the two 
corporations is the Foothill Village project. The contract was 
with ASM. However, the insurance was procured by ASI and billing 
16 || statements for materials were sent to ASI. Those statements were 
-.y then signed by officers of ASM. 
The Foothill Village project is just an example. The 
Riverton Ward project, Washington County Stake Center, and Valley 
19 || Junior High were handled in much the same way. 
It is clear that ASM was merely being used as a facade 
for the operations of ASI and its dominant stockholders. The 
Defendants were using ASM as a shell to operate a particular 
22 || aspect of their business. This factor, when combined with the 
23 others, militates for a finding that the corporate entity should 
be disregarded and the Defendants held liable for the debts of 
24 || 
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1 ASM, 
2 
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IV. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEBT 
The foregoing analysis shows why the corporate veil 
should be pierced, and the amount of Plaintiff's damages. The 
4 I  remaining issue is who is liable for the corporate debt, 
c ASI as the majority stockholders, should be liable. The 
two businesses were operated interchangeably by their principals. 
William C. Card, William Lane Card and Ray Rasmussen ran 
7 || the day to day operations of the corporation and were responsible 
for the corporation being operated as it was. They used the 
corporate form as a facade, without complying with the requisite 
corporate formalities, to operate their personal affairs. They 
10 || should be personally liable for the debts of ASM. 
-i-i Additionally, Ray Rasmussen and William Griswold should 
be liable as shareholders of ASM. 
V. CONCLUSION 
6 
8 
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13 || All of the essential facts of the Plaintiff's Complaint 
have been established and Plaintiff is entitled to Summary 
Judgment on the Complaint against said Defendants. ASM is liable 
on the debt to Plaintiff for the outstanding balance, interest, 
16 || and attorney's fees. ASM was operated as a facade or alter ego 
-jy of the other Defendants. As such, the other Defendants should 
be liable for ASM's debt. 
To allow ASI, when it is clear that ASM was 
19 undercapitalized, to pick and choose which creditors to pay and 
20 which not to pay works an injustice and fraud on those creditors 
whom ASI chooses, for who knows what reason, not to pay. 
The principals of these two corporations, who are the 
22 || other named defendants, should also be liable for their actions 
23 in perpetrating and perpetuating this injustice and fraud. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that its motion for 
21 
3 
1 Summary Judgment be granted and that the Court award Plaintiff 
p Judgment against the Defendants for the sum of $13,855.74, plus 
interest at eighteen percent (18%) from March 12, 1987 until paid 
in full plus attorney's fees in the amount of $2,531.25, plus 
4 1  costs of Court in the amount of $93.00. 
c DATED this <?&^{ d aV o f January, 1992, 
6 H£R£«NG & ASSOCIATES, P.C, 
a II ~<RAY M. $LA&DING, JR. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate copy 
12 || of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
13 OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid, this J??> day of January, 1992, to the 
following: 
Steven R. Chambers 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No. 1363 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No. 5711 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC. 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN; WILLIAM LANE CARD; 
WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM L. 
GRISWOLD; AND ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC. a Utah 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
LESLIE R. SOUTHAM 
Civil No. CV-89-102 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
ss 
) 
Leslie R. Southam, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That I am the Vice President of Southam and Warburton 
Aluminum Company, the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter; and 
that in such capacity, I have personal knowledge of the facts set 
forth in this Affidavit. 
2. Southam and Warburton Aluminum Company provided labor 
and material to Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal Inc. in the 
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amount of $13,855.74 on and between August 14, 1986 and March 12, 
1987. 
3. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal was billed for 
the above stated amount. 
4. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal did not, and has 
not at any time, indicated to Plaintiff that the labor and 
material were not satisfactory, nor have the Defendants returned 
any of the materials nor requested that additional work be done. 
5. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal has failed to pay 
on this matter despite the fact that demand has been made 
therefore. 
DATED this S~0 day of October^? 1991. 
X Subscribed and sworn . to before me this day of Subscribed a^ ia sworn to i 
October, 1991, by oQui^aJ/I\)&eriUA* ^ ^o 
k^7to-7^4^y 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES; 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING IN: 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
K®±^r?*tt3§& 
DOROTHY W00DC0X 
306 Wet Main 
American Rrt. Utah 84003 
My CoaafcsJoa &pb«£ 9-12-92 
SttioiUtti 
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RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No.1363 
JAMES "TUCKER" HANSEN, Bar No. 5711 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC. 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN; WILLIAM LANE CARD; 
WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM L. 
GRISWOLD; AND ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC. a Utah 
Corporation 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF M. CORT 
GRIFFIN 
Civil No. CV-89-102 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
ss 
) 
M. CORT GRIFFIN, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am an associate attorney with Harding & Associates, 
P. C., attorney for Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter; and 
that in such capacity, I have personal knowledge of the facts 
contained in this Affidavit. 
2. Plaintiffs propounded on Defendant Architectural 
3 
1 Sheet Metal Interrogatories and Request for Production of 
P Documents that included a request for "all corporate records and 
books of Architectural Sheet Metal and all financial records, 
ledgers, statements and balance sheets of Architectural Sheet 
4 I Metal from the date of inception of said corporation to the 
c present, including but not limited to, the Articles of 
Incorporation, the By-Laws, all minutes of all annual meetings, 
fi II 
" directors1 meetings, and any other meeting.11 
7 I  3 • In response to Plaintiff's Request for Production of 
8 
9 
11 
12 
14 
15 
Documents, Plaintiff's attorney received several boxes of 
records. Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal's representatives 
indicated that these were all the records of Architectural Sheet 
10 Metal, 
4. I have reviewed each and every record provided by 
Defendant Architectural Sheet Metal in response to Plaintiff's 
Request for Production of Documents. 
13 || 5. I observed that none of the following were contained 
in the records produced by Architectural Sheet Metal: Corporate 
By-Laws, Minutes from the corporation's organizational meeting, 
Minutes from the annual meeting of shareholders and/or directors, 
16 || and corporate resolutions. 
17H 6. There were no records regarding any written 
agreements between Architectural Sheet Metal and Architectural 
18 II 
Specialties Inc. for the loan of any moneys, 
19 || DATED this Z(^Q^ day of GcfeeS^r, 1991. 
20 
21 
22 || M. CORT GRIFFIN 
23 
24 
October, 
MY COMMIS? 
M. (KnntEUB<Sriff] 
ftAYUNE A. WATSON 
306 West Main 
American Fort, UBi 8*XB 
UyCommtoion Expires. 8-1-94 
Sa&ofUuh 
before roe t h i s J2aL~ d aY o f 
'1<h*L,L(«, f)iV^~tfon 
I NOTARY PUBLIC 
[RESIDING IN: 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. Steven Chambers (0613) 
Attorney for defendants Card, 
and Architectural Specialties, Inc, 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-3411 
^ 3" ' 3 '? PILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
o? Utah County. Stale o Utah 
CABMABSI^H.Clork^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC., 
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, WILLIAM C. CARD, 
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and 
and ROY RASMUSSEN, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM C. CARD 
Civil No. CV 89 102 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
William C. Card, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this case and have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. If called to 
testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. Architectural Specialties, Inc., is a Utah corporation 
whose shareholders are myself and my son William Lane Card. The 
two of us manage its business. At no time has Ray Rasmussen been 
involved in the management of Architectural Specialties, Inc. It 
was formed to provide specialty work in connection with building 
construction, such as doors, windows, and the like. 
3. Architectural Sheet Metal was a corporation formed by 
Ray Rasmussen to carry on sheet metal work such as heating and 
air conditioning duct work and the like. The line of work of 
Architectural Sheet Metal was completely different from that of 
Architectural Specialties. 
4. The shareholders of Architectural Sheet Metal were 
Architectural Specialties, William Griswold and Ray Rasmussen. 
At no time have I been a shareholder of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
5. Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural 
Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business. Ray 
Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did 
not consult with me regarding its operation. I received no 
compensation for acting as an officer of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
6. Architectural Specialties did not make use of 
Architectural Sheet Metal's funds or assets. 
7. Architectural Specialties filed its own tax return and 
did not include any income derived by Architectural Sheet Metal. 
8. Although Architectural Specialties and Architectural 
Sheet Metal were operated out of the same office, they did not 
share employees or bank accounts. 
141 
9. Neither Ray Rasmussen nor anyone from Architectural 
Sheet Metal was authorized to sign any documents for 
Architectural Specialties• 
10. I have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff 
in connection with its motion for summary judgment. The persons 
who signed those invoices were not an officer or director of 
Architectural Specialties, were not authorized to bind 
Architectural Specialties, nor were those persons an agent of 
myself nor similarly authorized to bind me. I believe that these 
persons signed the invoices simply because they happened to be 
present when the materials were delivered. I had no knowledge of 
these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit. 
11. To the best of my knowledge there has never been a 
written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on 
the one hand and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods 
purchased from plaintiff. 
Further the affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated March 11, 1992. 
/ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11, 1992 
I B S S33BBMKA' W ^ M i 
vX^w^y ^CommissionExpires I Notary P u b l i c 
\ ^ y CS^o?UtSr • R e s i d i n g a t : 
I-——— — — — — — —————J 
Commission expires: 
R. Steven Chambers (0613) 
Attorney for defendants Card, 
and Architectural Specialties, Inc. 
350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-3411 
FILED 3 * ( 3 -Cj X. 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. Slate of Utah 
CARMA 8 SMITH Clork 
y4ffi . Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM AND WARBURTON ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL, INC., 
a Utah corporation, ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., a Utah cor-
poration, WILLIAM C. CARD, 
WILLIAM LANE CARD, and 
and ROY RASMUSSEN, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM LANE CARD 
Civil No. CV 89 102 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
William Lane Card, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the defendants in this case and have 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein. If called to 
testify, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
2. I am not and have never been a shareholder of 
Architectural Sheet Metal. 
145 
3. Although I was listed as an officer of Architectural 
Sheet Metal, I took no part in the running of its business, Ray 
Rasmussen had control over the operation of that business and did 
not consult with me regarding its operation. I received no 
compensation for acting as an officer of Architectural Sheet 
Metal. 
4. I„have reviewed the invoices submitted by the plaintiff 
in connection with its motion for summary judgment. The person 
who signed those invoices was not an officer or director of 
Architectural Specialties, was not authorized to bind 
Architectural Specialties, nor was that person an agent of 
myself nor similarly authorized to bind me. I believe that this 
person signed these invoices simply because he happened to be 
present when the materials were delivered. I had no knowledge of 
these invoices prior to my review for this Affidavit. 
5. To the best of my knowledge there has never been a 
written agreement between Architectural Specialties or myself on 
the one hand, and the plaintiff on the other hand regarding goods 
purchased from plaintiff. 
6. I have read the Affidavit of William C. Card, submitted 
herewith, and agree with all the statements therein. All those 
statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, 
information and belief. 
Further the affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated March 11, 1992. - -
William Lane Card 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on March 11, 1992 
rfres I MyComml«aon Orto66r5 f1 
Commission expires: 
I 
Notary Public 
Residing at: <T 
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cCullough Jones 
& Ivlns 
)30 South State St 
FILED 111 
4ni DISTRICT COURT 
ST/T-'.- JTAH 
u: v i.- ;.TY 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON, ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM 
L. GRISWOLD 
Civil No. CV-89-102 vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL INC., 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN, WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
and WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM 
L. GRISWOLD, and ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM L. GRISWOLD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is a Defendant herein. 
2. That he is a member of Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 
312. 
3. That, in July, 1986, he was hired by William Card as a 
sheet metal worker at Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
1 
1 
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4. That he worked under a union-approved agreement with the 
company at an hourly wage of $16.15 per hour, and had no ownership 
interest or management responsibility in the corporation. 
5. That he did function as a supervisor for apprentice sheet 
metal workers in the field, but had no responsibilities in the 
office. 
6. That he may have occasionally signed an invoice to accept 
delivery of materials to Architectural Sheet Metal, but did so only 
because he was the only person available to do it; and such 
acceptance did not indicate authority for the company to make 
orders or to bind them to any agreements. 
7. That he never indicated either orally or in writing that 
he intended to bind himself personally to any agreement made by the 
corporation for which he worked. 
8. That the union contract under which he worked did not 
allow him to use his own car, or provide certain other services 
that the corporation wished him to perform. 
9. That, at the suggestion of William C. Card, he was 
transferred 245 shares of stock in the corporation in February, 
1988, thus giving him an ownership interest in the company, and 
relaxing the union restrictions on his conduct. That he had 
absolutely no ownership interest in the corporation at any time 
prior to 1988. 
Hough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
Jouth Stnio St 
Suilo 10 
i Utah 84050 
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10. That he did not function in management whatsoever after 
he was conveyed a minority stockholders interest, did not serve as 
an officer or director, and did not exercise any of the functions 
thereof. 
11. That, to the best of his knowledge, Architectural Sheet 
Metal, Inc., functioned as a corporation, with officers, a board of 
directors, and appropriate reports and paperwork. 
12. That, less than one year after he was transferred stock 
ownership, the company ceased to do business, and therefore held no 
additional annual meetings of stockholders in which he was invited 
to participate. 
13. That the payments made to him by our Architectural Sheet 
Metal was for payroll, and occasional reimbursement for expenses, 
and that he was treated as an employee of the corporation for all 
purposes, including tax purposes. 
14. That he did not personally order any of the materials 
allegedly delivered by Southam & Warburton. 
DATED this day of E [ A A 6 1 M , 1992 . 
Wil l i am L. Griswold, Defendar 
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lough Jones, 
& Ivlns 
oulh State St 
Suite 10 
Utnh 840^8 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
, 1992. 
*#" day of 
V?Mu 
J T-» _ _ 1_ 1 ^  _ Notary Pub l ic 
My commission e x p i r e s : LjjjjjI^Lj 
Residing a t : 
misc\griswold.off 
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cCultough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of ^ , 1992, 
I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Affidavit of William L. Griswold, postage prepaid to Ray M. 
Harding, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. Box 126, American Fork, 
Utah 84003 and R. Steven Chambers, Attorney for Defendants Card and 
Architectural Specialties, 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. 
1^/iAly, Q U J ^ J ; 
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lough, Jonos, 
& Ivins 
oulh State St 
Suite 10 
Utnh 84058 
h 3 A V ft '92 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
Attorneys for Defendants Rasmussen and Griswold 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON, ALUMINUM : AFFIDAVIT OF RAY RASMUSSEN 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL INC., 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN, WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
and WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM 
L. GRISWOLD, and ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. CV-89-102 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
RAY RASMUSSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That he is a Defendant herein. 
2. That he is a member of Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 
312. 
3. That, prior to 1986, he was hired by William C. Card and 
Todd Wheeler, partners doing business as Precision Sheet Metal, to 
1 
163 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
do sheet metal work for that partnership. 
4. That his initial job description also included field 
supervision and management of specific projects, including hiring 
of field workers, but not business management. 
5. That, on or about June 16, 1986, that business was 
incorporated as Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc. 
6. That, upon incorporation, he became part owner of the 
business, along with the former partners. 
7. That the Articles of Incorporation and other legal 
documents pertaining to the formation of the corporation were 
prepared by Spafford & Spafford, who had served as attorneys for 
William C. Card, and who served as initial registered agent for the 
corporation. 
8. That, upon information and belief, he believes that the 
by-laws and papers pertaining to the incorporation meeting were 
prepared by said attorneys. 
9. That the formalities of incorporation occurred in the 
office of Spafford & Spafford. 
10. That, when the corporation was first formed, he served as 
vice president, with Todd Wheeler as president and William C. Card 
as secretary. 
11. That William C. Card retained a majority interest in the 
corporation, being issued 510 shares of stock in said corporation, 
AcCullough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
930 South State St 
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through his own separate corporation, Architectural Specialties. 
12. That he and Todd Wheeler each were originally issued 245 
shares of stock in the corporation, representing 49%. 
13. That he first served as Vice President of the 
corporation, and then as President of the corporation, being 
responsible for day-to-day working of the corporation. 
14. That Todd Wheeler and William C. Card set up an account 
with Plaintiff, and actually ordered and priced the material which 
is at issue herein. 
15. That William Card retained actual control of the 
corporation, and that all major decisions were made by William C. 
Card or with Mr. Card's approval. 
16. That the Board of Directors did meet regularly, and that 
minutes were kept. 
17. That it was the duty of William C. Card, as secretary of 
the corporation, to keep said minutes, and that he, while having 
seen such minutes, does not possess them. 
18. That Architectural Specialties is a corporation run by 
William C. Card and William L. Card, and that this Defendant never 
had any interest whatsoever in said corporation, and had nothing to 
do with the operations thereof. 
19. That the two corporations did share an office, but did 
not mingle funds, and did not engage in any joint operations. 
illough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
Souih Slato SI 
Suite 10 
I I Utnh 84058 
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20. That the corporations did share a secretary, the salary 
of whom was paid partly by each corporation; and the two 
corporations shared office expenses. 
21. That Architectural Specialties was in a different 
business, making specialty items including doors, railings, sky 
lights, moldings and windows. 
22. That Architectural Sheet Metal worked with sheet metal, 
such as on roofs, store fronts and facias. 
23. That the operations of the two corporations were 
completely separate, except for the office and secretary sharing 
set forth above. 
24. That he may have occasionally signed for materials being 
sold to Architectural Specialties, simply because he was in the 
office at the time of delivery; but he did not have any authority 
to act as an agent of Architectural Specialties, and did not do so. 
25. That the only payments made to him for which payroll 
taxes were not deducted were reimbursements for expenses; and that 
careful records were made of all payroll expenses, and that he was 
treated as an employee of the corporation for all purposes, 
including tax purposes. 
26. That he did not personally order any of the materials 
allegedly delivered by Southam & Warburton, and that he did not 
indicate at any time, either in writing or orally, that he would be 
IcCullough, Jones, 
5. Ivins 
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personally responsible for any such orders or the payment of any 
such account. 
27. That, when Todd Wheeler left the corporation, his place 
on the Board of Directors and status as an officer were transferred 
to William L. Card, the son of William C. Card. 
28. That, for a short time, he was transferred the shares of 
Todd Wheeler, thus owning 49% of the corporation, still a minority 
interest. 
29. That he resigned as officer and director of Architectural 
Sheet Metal, Inc. on December 10, 1988, and relinquished his stock 
at that time. 
30. That he has not been associated in any way with 
Architectural Sheet Metal, Inc., William C. Card, or any other 
Defendant in any business relationship since that time. 
31. That William L. Card did not participate in the day-to-
day management of the corporation. 
32. That Mr. Griswold had absolutely no ownership in the 
corporation at any time prior to 1988. 
33. That Mr. Griswold, while having some supervisory duties 
over apprentice sheet metal workers, did not participate in 
management of the corporation whatsoever; and was never made an 
officer or director of the corporation. 
34. That William Griswold was hired by the corporation as a 
augh, J o n e s , 
< i v ins 
uih Stale St 
uito 10 
Utah 84058 
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journeyman sheet metal worker, on a union contract; and that Mr. 
Griswold was likewise a member of the Sheet Metal Workers Union, 
Local 312. 
35. That Mr. Griswold was transferred 245 shares of stock in 
the corporation in 1988, in an effort by the Corporation to give 
him an ownership interest, thus freeing him from some of the 
restrictions in the union contract, and giving the corporation more 
flexibility, and thus saving money. 
DATED this day of K Q Q ^ 1992. 
Ray ^ as^iussen, Defendant 
29^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
//?&// , 1992. 
day 
u Notary P i ^ l i c 
My commission e x p i r e s : ^ 1 2*3- /*?*?£> 
Residing at :"*5y9r}nt f C? < 
misc\rasnussen.aff 
j 9 ( ^ K UflP-J 
NELDA BIRD 
KOIW PUBLIC-SIM el UTAH 
119 SOUTH MAIM ST. BX 717 
SPRINGVILLE.UT 84683 
COM®. EXP. 5-20-95 
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South Stnto Si 
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ii Ul.-ih R405B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the f day of 
Qf/M - • 1992, 
I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Affidavit of Ray Rasmussen, postage prepaid to Ray M. Harding, Jr., 
Attorney for Plaintiff, P.O. Box 126, American Fork, Utah 84003 and 
R. Steven Chambers, Attorney for Defendants Card and Architectural 
Specialties, 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 1 1 . 
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:fottrtfj Circuit Court 
Judge E. Patrick McGuire 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON, ALUMINUM COMPANY 
VS. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL INC., 
RAY RASMUSSEN, 
WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
WILLIAM C. CARD, 
WILLIAM C. GRISWOLD, AND 
ARCHITECTURAL SPECIALTIES, INC. 
CIVIL # 920000048 
DATE: 25 MARCH 1993 
MEMORANDUM, 
THIS MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS ON THE 16TH DAY OF 
DECEMBER, 1992. 
THE COURT HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE ENTIRE FILE WHICH WAS FIRST 
FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT, THEN TRANSFERRED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT 
IN SPANISH FORK AND FINALLY TO PROVO AND THE AUTHOR OF THIS 
RULING. THE COURT NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
THIS FILE IS HARDLY AS INTIMIDATING AS THE SIZE OF IT WOULD PORTEND. 
IT PRESENTS A RATHER SIMPLE QUESTION; THAT IS CAN PLAINTIFF PIERCE 
THE CORPORATE VEIL AND HOLD THE DEFENDANTS NAMED PERSONALLY 
LIABLE FOR THE DEBT CLAIMED? 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS WELL PRESENTED THE 
CORPORATE PIERCING THEORY AND HAS WELL DOCUMENTED HIS 
ARGUMENTS WITH AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT IN 
THE COURTS OPINION MET THESE ARGUMENTS WITH AFFIDAVIT OR 
DOCUMENTATION IN SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY TO RAISE THE ARGUMENT OF A 
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT. 
THEREFORE PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS. PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE JUDGMENT AND PROPER 
ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS AND SUBMIT SAME TO THE COURT WITH A 
COPY TO COUNSEL FOR EACH PARTY. 
* . ' . 
125 North 100 West / Provo, Utah 84601 
-TWO-
BY ORDER OF THE COURT, 
/ / < ^ ^ t ^ ^ f 
fe/E. PATPJCK MCGUiRE-^ JUDGE/
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
COPIES TO COUNSEL OF ALL THE PARTIES NAMED IN THE HEADING OF THIS 
DOCUMENT. 
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RAY M. HARDING, JR. Bar No. 13 63 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPT, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON, ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL INC., 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN, WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
and WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM 
L. GRISWOLD, and ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9200^064-8 
3/91 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for hearing in 
accordance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Plaintiff having moved the court for Summary 
Judgment against the Defendants, and the Court having heard oral 
argument on the matter and having reviewed the pleadings on file 
herein, and all memorandum presented by the parties and the Court 
having taken the matter under advisement, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Plaintiff is 
awarded Judgment against the Defendants, Architectural Sheet 
Metal Inc. a Utah Corporation, Ray Rasmussen, William Lane Card, 
1 William C. Card, William L. Griswold, Architectural Specialities, 
2 Inc. a Utah Corporation, and each of them in the principal sum 
3 of $13,855.74, plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 
4 March 12, 1987 to the date of Judgment; plus reasonable 
5 attorney's fees in the sum of $2,531.25; plus costs of Court 
6 incurred in this matter in the sum of $93.00, with interest to 
7 accrue on the principal sum, attorney's fees and costs, at the 
8 rate of 18% per annum until paid in full, and after accruing 
9 costs. This Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
10 reasonable attorney's fees expended in collecting said Judgment 
11 by execution or otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit. 
12 DATED this "* | day of May, 1993. 
1 3 II BY THE COURT: 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid by first-class 
mail, on this day of May, 1993, to the following: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5„ 
Andrew W. McCullough 
6 || MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
930 South State Street 
7 || Suite 10 
Orem, UT 84058 
s;; 
Steven Chambers 
9 || 350 South 400 East 
Suite 114 
10 l| Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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jfourti} Circuit Court 
Judge E. Patrick McGuire 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON MEMORANDUM 
VS 
ARCHTTECURAL SHEET METAL, ET AL. 
CIVIL # 920-3191 
June 9, 1993 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
ON THE ABOVE MATTER THE COURT IS RESPONDING TO MR. 
MCULLOUGHS' LETTER OF MAY 20, 1993 AND HIS PRIOR MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT. 
THE COURT SEES NO REASON FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS. IT WAS THE 
COURTS INTENT TO HOLD THE DEFENDANTS SPECIALTIES, INC., WILLIAM C. 
CARD AND WILLIAM LANE CARD LIABLE ON THE DEBT AND HEREBY DENIES 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
M 
JUDGE E. PATRICK MCGUIRE 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
PROVO, UTAH 
125 North 100 West / Provo, Utah 84601 
3? 3 
'*) .' 
»U U'JL. L I ! i 1.C L 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
RAY M. HARDING, JR., Bar No 1363 
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
306 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 126 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPT. 
STATE OP UTAH 
SOUTHAM & WARBURTON, ALUMINUM 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARCHITECTURAL SHEET METAL INC., 
a Utah Corporation, RAY 
RASMUSSEN, WILLIAM LANE CARD, 
and WILLIAM C. CARD, WILLIAM 
L. GRISWOLD, and ARCHITECTURAL 
SPECIALTIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT • S 
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 92-0-3191/CV 
The court, having previously entered judgment in the 
above referenced matter, having received a Motion to Alter or 
Amend the Judgment filed on behalf of both attorneys for the 
various parties in this matter, having reviewed said Motions and 
all other documents submitted, finds that there is sufficient 
basis for the judgment entered herein and sees no reason to amend 
or alter the judgment, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendants1 Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment is hereby denied. 
Additionally, Defendants' Motion for Oral Argument is also 
1 II denied. . ___ 
2 DATED this C7 7" day of J»rrer, 1993 
3 || BY THE COURT: 
4 
5II /^ 
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8 I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate copy 
9 of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND OR 
10 ALTER JUDGMENT, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this 
11 30* day of June, 1993, to the following: 
12 || Andrew W. McCullough 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
13|| 930 South State Street 
Suite 10 
14 || Orem, UT 84058 
15 || Steven Chambers 
350 South 400 East 
16 || Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
17;; 
Stephen Henriod 
18 || 185 South State, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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